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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case ko. 870330-CA 
v* : 
DALE LYNN BAUMGAERTEL, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JDBISDICTIQB-AHD-fiAlHBJE.fiE^ feBflCB£DIMSS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Burglary, a 
Third Degree Felony in violation of Utah (Code Ann. S 76-6-202 
(1953, as amended) after a bench trial iri the Third Judicial 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-26(b)(1) (1953, as amended) and Utah 
Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
STAl£MEMl^DE«ISSUJES«£B£S£HlkD«Q^AE£fiAL 
1. Whether the deputy had a reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, to make an investigative stop of 
defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953 L as amended): 
Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer 
may stop any person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
SIAIEMEHI_QE_IBE_C&SE 
Defendant, Dale Lynn Baumgaertel, appeals from a 
judgment and conviction of burglary, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-202 (1953, as amended). 
Defendant was convicted after submission of stipulated facts in 
addition to facts from his Motion to Suppress hearing in the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding. 
£IAlEM£gT_QF_E&CIS 
On February 2, 1987 at 4:30 a.m., Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Deputy Duane Jensen was driving westbound on 3500 South 
(T. 5).1 At about 8120 West, Deputy Jensen passed an automotive 
parts and service shop, called "Ernie's Automotive," and a 
parking lot adjacent to the shop (T. 6)• At that time, the 
deputy observed a truck pulling out of the parking lot. The 
truck proceeded eastbound on 3500 South (T. 6)• 
Deputy Jensen had inspected the parking lot and the 
establishment approximately fifteen minutes earlier and had not 
seen this truck (T. 7, 8). The deputy believed that this 
particular business had been burglarized in recent times and that 
there was no alarm system at this store (T. 10, 11)• Because of 
the lateness of the hour, the fact that the business had been 
closed for some time, and his belief of the recent burglary, 
Deputy Jensen made a U-turn in order to observe the truck (T. 
11). Jensen observed that as he was making his U-turn, the truck 
1 «T« r ef e r s to Transcript of Motion to Suppress Hearing held 
March 20, 1987. 
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accelerated in order to get away from him (T. 12). He could not 
determine, however, if any traffic violations had occurred, but 
he did feel that the acceleration was faster than normal (T. 22). 
At 8000 South, both the truck and the Deputy made right 
turns and headed south (T. 13). On Washington Road, the truck 
turned left and traveled east into a residential area. It then 
pulled into the driveway of a residence in a small cul-de-sac (T. 
13, 14). 
Deputy Jensen turned on his bright lights after pulling 
behind the truck in order to notify the occupants that he was a 
police officer and wanted to talk to them (T. 23). Jensen got 
out of his car and met the driver of the truck who was coming 
toward the police car (T. 14). As he was getting out of the 
police car, Deputy Jensen observed numerous auto parts in the 
back of the truck (T. 14-15). 
On March 20, 1987, a suppression hearing was held 
before Judge Wilkinson regarding the legality of the stop (T. 1). 
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant's 
motion to suppress (T. 60)• Because the ohly arguable issue in 
the case was the legality of the stop, the case was submitted to 
the court without further testimony (Trial Transcript at p. 2). 
The court, based upon the evidence presented at the suppression 
hearing, and supplemented by the stipulations of counsel, found 
the defendant guilty of burglary, a third degree felony (Trial 
Transcript at p.8). 
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SUWSAfiX-fiE-AfifiUBEtiX 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
that Deputy Jensen had a reasonable suspicion in making an 
investigatory stop of the truck in which defendant was a 
passenger. Thusf the trial court properly admitted the evidence 
found pursuant to the stop. 
AEGUM£tfl 
PfilHLI 
THE DEPUTY HAD A REASONABLE SUSPICION, BASED 
ON OBJECTIVE FACTS, NECESSARY TO EFFECT AN 
INVESTIGATIVE STOP. 
In the landmark case of l£LLX-XjL-QhLQr 392 U.S. 1, 88 
S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, (1968), the United States Supreme 
Court addressed "the role of the Fourth Amendment in the 
confrontation on the street between the citizen and the policeman 
investigating suspicious circumstances." l£|. at 4. Although 
T£Iiy_Y.i._QlU2 discusses both stops and frisks, only the court's 
analysis of the reasonableness of the initial stop is directly 
applicable to the case at hand. 
Citing to the case of T£LLX„x±„QhLQ* the Utah Court of 
Appeals in SiaJtfi«XjL«ltUjillfi# 739 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1987) 
repeated that "a police officer, in appropriate circumstances and 
in an appropriate manner, may approach a person for purposes of 
investigating suspected criminal behavior even though there is 
not probable cause to make an arrest." Such appropriate 
circumstances have been codified in Utah Code Ann. $ 77-7*15 
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(1953, as amended) which states: 
Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer 
may stop any person in a public place when he 
has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and 
may demand his name, address, and an 
explanation of his actions. 
Subsequent to the inception of this statute, the Utah 
Supreme Court in £iai£_JU_£HaDigaDf 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), 
stated that an investigative stop may not be based solely on a 
mere hunch. The Court determined that an investigative stop is 
only permissible "when the officers 'have a reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, that the individual [stopped] is 
involved in criminal activity.1" S.ta£s_JU_SttaDi3an# 699 P.2d 
718, 719 (Utah 1985), quoting BieHD_JLi_l£2$aS # 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 
S. Ct. 2637, 2640, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). 
In the present case, the State asserts that Deputy 
Jensen had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, based on 
objective facts, when he stopped defendant. Thus, the 
investigative stop of defendant was proper and all evidence 
obtained as a result of the stop was admissible. 
At the suppression hearing, Deputy Jensen testified as 
to several factors which were the bases for his reasonable 
suspicion that a public offense had been committed. First, 
Deputy Jensen testified that "it was [his] belief that [Ernie's 
Automotive] had been burglarized before in the past and that 
there was no alarm system on the building" (T. 10). Upon further 
questioning, the Deputy stated that he believed the previous 
burglaries of the business to have been recently committed (T. 
11). 
•5-
Second, Deputy Jensen regularly patrolled the area 
where these events occurred as he knew that Ernie's Automotive 
was routinely closed at 8:00 p.m. (T. 7, 11). It was 4:30 a.m. 
at the time he observed the truck which made it extremely 
peculiar for a vehicle to be pulling out of a business parking 
lot at that hour (T. 6-7). 
Finally, the deputy had patrolled the area just fifteen 
to twenty minutes earlier and had not seen any sign of activity 
or a truck such as the one in which the defendant was a passenger 
(T. 7-8). Additionally, there was no access to any other 
businesses or dwellings through the parking lot which could have 
explained the truck's exit from Ernie's Automotive (T. 12). 
On the basis of these three factors: 1) the lateness 
of the hour; 2) the deputy's belief that Ernie's Automotive had 
been a recently burglarized; and 3) the appearance of a truck 
exiting the business parking lot adjacent to Ernie's Automotive 
which had not been at the establishment fifteen to twenty minutes 
earlier, Deputy Jensen formed a reasonable suspicion that a 
public offense had been committed justifying a brief 
investigative stop. 
Defendant, in his brief, argues that the facts in £££Jt£ 
JU-CfllPfiDfl$ 714 P.2d 675 (Utah 1986) are essentially identical to 
those in this case. Upon closer scrutiny, however, there are 
obvious distinguishing factors between the two fact situations. 
In CfllfifiMr the police officer was patrolling an area where there 
had been a rash of recent burglaries. Beyond this, the 
similarities fade. In CfllPfiDflr the officer merely observed a 
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slow-moving vehicle with Arizona license plates in the area of 
previous burglaries at 3:00 a.m. After following the car for 
three blocks, the officer initiated a stop. 
In contrast, Deputy Jensen based his stop on an 
important additional factor. Jensen actually saw the truck 
exiting a business that he thought had been recently burglarized. 
The defendant was not merely driving down a residential street as 
in Cj3IB£D3r he was actually exiting a business establishment that 
had been closed for eight hours, It is much less suspicious for 
someone to be returning to or departing frqm a residential area 
at an early morning hour due to late-night entertainment, 
travelling, or even work schedules, than fc)r someone to be 
exiting a parking lot adjacent to a business that has been closed 
for eight hours, and is not scheduled to o^en for several more. 
Defendant also points out that the deputy testified 
that he "pulled [defendant] over because [he] had a hunch that 
there had been criminal activity." (T. 25) . In the case of 
£ta£fi_y.i_£tfaDisanr 699 P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled that a stop based on a mere "hv^nch," rather than 
"reasonable suspicion," was unconstitutional. In that case, a 
police officer was called to investigate a burglary. While 
enroute, the officer noticed two individuals walking along the 
road. He called the dispatcher and requested that an attempt be 
made to locate the individuals. Over two hours later, another 
officer saw two individuals fitting the earlier description 
given. The officer followed the two men for three blocks and 
then stopped them. Clearly, there were no facts whatsoever to 
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link the two individuals to the reported burglary. The officers 
in that case acted upon what has been termed a "hunch". 
The stop in StfflDigan is distinguishable from the stop 
in the case at hand. Deputy Jensen's "hunch" consisted of much 
more than defendant would have the court believe. For defendant 
to base his argument on the deputy's use of the word "hunch" is 
to participate in a useless game of semantics. As noted earlier, 
the deputy's suspicion was supported by three objective factors. 
First, it was 4:30 a.m. as the truck pulled out of the business 
parking lot adjacent to a business establishment which had been 
closed for eight hours. Second, Deputy Jensen believed that 
there had been a rash of burglaries in the area, that this very 
business had been recently burglarized, and that there was no 
alarm system. Finally, Deputy Jensen had been in the area 
fifteen to twenty minutes earlier, had checked this business and 
parking area, and had not seen this truck. 
The specific objective factors such as noted above 
constitute more than a mere "hunch". Together, they form the 
requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to make a valid 
investigatory stop. Based upon these objective factors, the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the 
deputy had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and that 
the evidence observed in "plain view" pursuant to the 
investigative stop was admissible. 
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